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Starting from an analysis of the impact of digitalization on transnationality, the paper 
examines the impact of the rise of ICT and digital TNCs for theory and policy. 
Conclusions include the following. (1) The rise of Tech  - ICT and digital - TNCs 
makes it compelling that economists devote more time to the incorporation of the 
study of TNCs within the body of economics. (2) The theory of the TNC in itself may 
need reconsideration on the basis of changes in the real economy in terms of the 
growing relevance of digital TNCs. They pose theory challenges in that the foreign 
assets component of international production is becoming less relevant while liquid 
assets are increasing. We need to rethink our conceptualization and definition of 
TNCs to fit in with the growing digitalization of the economy. (3) There are also great 
policy challenges deriving from the differences in regulatory regimes between 
different nation-states and characteristics of these TNCs. These challenges allow 
TNCs in general - and the digital TNCs to an even higher extent – to: minimize their 
tax liability; avoid responsibility for their workforce; affect the democratic processes 
across countries.  
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Digitalization has been with us for a couple of decades and is now all pervasive. It 
affects every sphere of economic activity: from production to consumption to the 
interaction between the State and its citizens. The latter interaction is in terms of: the 
delivery of public services; the collection of revenue; and the development and 
implementation of public policies. 
 The transnational companies (TNCs)1 have been with us for much 
longer. Steven Hymer (1976 [1960]) - who developed the first theory of the 
international firm - dates the modern transnational to after the Second World 
War. Its very distant antecedents can be dated much further back even before 
the birth of nation-states. Transborder direct business operations were indeed 
part of the activities of the Medici bank with headquarters in fifteenth century 
Florence.   
More recently-established companies, such as the East India Company, 
the Royal African Company, the Hudson Bay Company and others dating back 
to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are sometimes considered to be the 
forerunners of the modern TNC. However, these companies were chartered 
by governments to carry trading business operations in colonies. The 
specificity of their operations and the fact that the charter was for business in 
the colonies – which were considered part of the country whose government 
had granted the charter – make these companies substantially different from 
the modern transnational corporation. 
Hymer does not consider any of these companies to have been the 
forerunners of the modern TNC because they lacked a key element of 
modernity on business: the ability to control and manage at a distance2. This 
was realized only with the modern means of transport and communication 
available after WWII. Management and control of operations became possible 
owing to cheaper and faster transportation and communication technologies. 
Changes in the internal organization of companies developed alongside 
improvement in such technologies and they all contributed to the increase in 
the number and activities of transnational companies worldwide. 
In this paper I shall concentrate on developments in the last decade, the 
years that have seen the emergence and growth of the digital transnational 
corporations though I shall also consider wider issues linked to technology 
transnational in general.  
The next section deals with digitalization and the TNC. Section three and 
four tackle, respectively, issues of theory and policy with regards to the 
transnational companies and which arise from digitalization. Section five deals 
with macro issues and the last section summarizes and concludes. 
  
 
2. Digitalization and the TNC  
                                                
1 The terms transnational company/corporation (TNC) or multinational 
company/corporation/enterprise (MNC or MNE) or international firm/enterprise 
(IF/IE) are used interchangeably in the literature and in this text. 




Digitalization is part and parcel of the activities of transnational companies at an even 
greater extent than of other agents in the system. It plays a key role in strategies 
regarding: the movements of resources across space and frontiers; the development of 
production processes and of value chains across space and countries; and strategies 
regarding internalization versus externalization of production whether the latter takes 
place as sub-contracting or collaborative ventures or arm’s length procurements. It 
also plays a big role in the governance of large institutions and their internal 
organization be they private – like the transnational corporations – or public. 
 But the symbiosis between digitalization and transnational activities has, in the 
last decade, taken a much stronger connotation than the facilitating of strategies and 
activities across frontiers and institutions. This change has occurred via the activities 
of the digital TNCs. 
 Box 1 reproduces categories taken from a UNCTAD Report on the Digital 
Economy. It distinguishes between Digital MNEs and ICT (Information and 
Communication Technology) MNEs. The latter companies provide hardware and 
software infrastructure as well as the communication infrastructure. 
 The digital MNEs are those transnational companies whose raison d’etre has 
to do with digital technology – specifically the internet - in terms of their products, 
processes and interaction with customers, labour and markets. The digital 
corporations cannot but be transnationals: from Google to Amazon to Uber to 
Facebook. They have penetrated a variety of sectors from information to consumer 
products to transportation. They are generating enormous effects on established 
business, on the workforce and on governments. 
 The contribution of all the sectors reported in Box 1 to the population of TNCs 
worldwide is now very relevant and has been increasing. For example, the number of 
largest MNEs – part of the world top 100 non-financial multinationals - in Category 
2a of Box 1 (manufactures of hardware and software as well as providers of software 
services) has increased from 4 in 2010 to 10 in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2017: p. 159). 
 The growth in number and relevance of operators in the digital field changes 
the sectoral landscape of industry. Moreover, there are important qualitative 




























Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2017: p. 165) 
 
In facing up to the full impact of the digital revolutions and specifically of digital 
TNCs we must be aware that they raise issues not just in terms of quantitative growth 
of the sector. There are very important qualitative issues which beg questions about 
our theoretical approach to the TNCs as well as policy issues for governments. Let us 
look at them in more detail. I shall first deal with theory issues; in particular, the 
theory of the transnational corporation.  
 
 
3. Theory issues   
  
3.1. The digital companies and the definition of TNCs 
 
Are our conceptualization, definition and empirics of TNCs compatible with the 
characteristics of TNCs listed in Section three and in particular with the development 
and growth of digital TNCs? Theory issues arise from two main structural changes 
which have emerged in the last few decades. The first one is the most recent one 
1. Digital MNEs are characterized by the central role of the internet in their 
operating and delivery model. They include purely digital players (internet 
platforms and providers of digital solutions) that operate entirely in a digital 
environment and mixed players (e-commerce and digital content) that combine a 
prominent digital dimension with a physical one. 
  a. Internet platforms: digitally born businesses, operated and delivered through 
the internet, e.g. search engines, social networks and other platforms, such as for 
sharing. 
  b. Digital solutions: other internet-based players and digital enablers, such as 
electronic and digital payment operators, cloud players and other service providers. 
  c. E-commerce: online platforms that enable commercial transactions, including 
internet retailers and online travel agencies. Delivery may be digital (if the content 
of the transaction is digital) or physical (if the content is tangible). 
  d. Digital content: producers and distributors of goods and services in digital 
format, including digital media (e.g. video and TV, music, e-books) and games, as 
well as data and analytics. Digital content can be delivered through the internet but 
also through other channels (e.g. cable TV).  
2. ICT MNEs provide the enabling infrastructure that makes the internet 
accessible to individuals and businesses. They include IT companies selling 
hardware and software, as well as telecom firms. 
  a. IT: manufacturers of devices and components (hardware), software developers   
and providers of IT services. 
  b. Telecom: providers of telecommunication infrastructure and connectivity. 
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having emerged and grown in the last decade. It relates to characteristic (e) above: the 
relative low level of foreign assets in digital TNCs in relation to other TNCs. 
 Transnational companies are defined by their ownership of assets abroad 
leading to direct business activities – international production - in foreign countries. 
The traditional definition of TNC is as a corporation that owns assets and uses those 
assets to operate direct business activities in at least two countries. Foreign assets – 
built-up via foreign direct investment (FDI) – are therefore part and parcel of the 
definition of TNC.  
 
Table 1. Average ratios of foreign sales to foreign assets by sector. Largest world 
non-financial TNCs, 2015  
 
Sector Ratios for subsectors Ratios for main sectors 
Internet platforms: 
  Search engines 
  Social networks 
  Other platforms 
 
Digital solutions: 
  Electronic payments 
  Other 
 
Digital content&e-comm: 
  Internet retail 
  Other e-commerce 
 











































Source: Author adaptation from UNCTAD (2017, Fig IV8: p. 171) 
 
Table 1 presents data for 2015 on the ratios between foreign sales and foreign assets. 
The data relate to the whole sector of TNCs and is detailed for those operating in the 
ICT and digital sectors. The table shows that the internet-based MNEs such as 
Alphabet (parent company of Google) or Facebook have a ratio of foreign revenue to 
foreign assets of 2.6. For the non-digitally based MNEs – which are, nonetheless 
users of digital technologies – the ratio is 1. This means that some of the most recent 
and powerful MNEs in the world use relatively little capital in relation to their 
revenue. Most of them use also very little labour force directly. Does that make the 
companies less transnational? It would seem absurd to consider Google or rather 
Alphabet  and Facebook or Tweeter non-transnational. They obviously are. However, 
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their emergence, growth and characteristics mean that we may need to rethink our 
definition and conceptualization of a TNC.  
 It might seem plausible to shift the definition of a TNC from the focus on 
foreign assets to a focus on foreign revenue. In fact, as noted in characteristic (a) 
above, the social media TNCs raise their revenue not from the sale of their services 
but from selling advertising space on their platforms. Nonetheless, the emphasis is on 
revenue rather than foreign assets. 
 However, when we shift the focus from foreign assets to foreign revenue/sales 
we encounter another problem: foreign revenue and sales can also be achieved by 
exports: the traditional modality for reaching foreign markets. Are the big digital 
companies exporting products produced in the home country? Where, indeed, are the 
products of Google or Twitter or Facebook produced? Difficult to say given 
characteristic (d): ‘non-location bound production processes and products’.  
 Moreover, as noted in (f) above most of these companies keep large liquid 
assets overseas. How common is this practice among other TNCs? Are we witnessing 
the emergence of TNCs characterized by decrease in foreign fixed assets but with 
increase in liquid ones? 
 In other words the whole field of the nature and characteristics of digital TNCs 
and indeed, possibly, of many other TNCs, needs further thought. 
 
3.2. Labour and the definition of firms and TNCs 
 
In the previous sub-section we discussed a specific structural change - related to 
foreign assets - in the universe and typology of TNCs caused by the internet. We 
raised the issue of whether such changes might lead to a reconsideration of our 
definition and approach to the TNC. 
 In the last few decades there has been another very relevant structural change. 
affecting all firm – national and transnational ones – as well as other institutions: 
changes in the organization of production with great effects on the labour force.  
The changes we are interested in affect TNCs to a higher degree than other 
firms/institutions. They relate to the organization of the production process with 
externalization of large amount of production components and business functions. 
Such changes have started a few decades ago under the neoliberal agenda and have 
been aided by the digital technologies. 
 Externalization can take place to a variety of degrees: from full arm’s length 
transaction where the company buys components or services on the open market; to 
contractual externalization in which the company uses a variety of contractual 
outsourcing arrangements – from sub-contracting to franchisees to licensing among 
others - to secure the supply of components and delivery of services. Companies want 
to outsource but they also want to retain control over their brand, the quality of 
products and, possibly, delivery times. In all these forms one element remains 
common to all outsourcing modalities: they all involve full externalization of the 
responsibility for the labour employed in the production of the outsourced 
components. In many cases the contractor is also responsible for investing capital in 
the business.  
 This is the case, for example, of McDonald who retains control over the brand, 
the quality of the product and services. However, responsibility for the labour 
employed in the franchises rests with the franchisee as does the cost and risk of 
investing in the outlet serving McDonald hamburgers. So, the business model is based 
on: externalization of responsibility for labour in the context of control. 
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 These trends in the externalization of production have greatly contributed to 
the relative decline in employment for which the TNCs have direct responsibility in 
relation to their revenue. UNCTAD (1995) reports total employment by TNCs in 
headquarters and affiliate to be 86m. Later data show a decline, namely to 77m in the 
early 2000s (UNCTAD, 2009a) and 73m more recently (UNCTAD, 2018: Table 1.6). 
This declining trend has taken place alongside large increases in the number of TNCs 
worldwide, their revenue and their activities in general.  
 Some economists have been thinking that, in the context of large scale 
externalization with retention of control on the part of big companies, a new 
definition of firm and of transnational firm is necessary. Cowling and Sugden (1987: 
12) demarcate between firms and transnationals and thus define the two: ‘A firm is 
the means of coordinating production from one center of strategic decision-making. A 
transnational is the means of coordinating production from one center of strategic 
decision-making when this coordination takes a firm across national boundaries’.  
Similarly, and more recently, Dunning and Lundan (2008) shifted the focus of the 
firm from the legal definition in terms of ownership of assets towards the strategic 
coordination of business networks some of which may be wholly or partly owned and 
some are controlled without ownership but via contractual arrangements. 
 The model with shifted responsibilities for labour applies to McDonald and, to 
an even stronger extent, to Uber where the responsibility for labour lies with…the 
individual workers themselves: they are deemed to be self employed. Here is where 
issues of labour law, sectoral demarcation and labour relations all play a role.  
 One problem for capital is that the use of digital technologies is no longer 
confined to big firms and institutions: your humble, geographically-dispersed workers 
have access to the internet: in fact, in many cases, to be able to work for large 
companies, access to the internet is essential. But the internet can also be used to 
organize labour by trade unions and/or by willing and pro-active workers themselves 
and not just for the organization of global value chains or the movements of large 
sums across the globe by companies.   
 Signs of change are in the air. We have, recently, witnessed strikes in many 
states and countries. What is more relevant is that some of the strikes have been 
organized across borders and some across firms in the same industry. Examples of the 
first type are the strikes organized by workers employed in McDonald’s franchises 
across many US States in 2015 (Ietto-Gillies, 2017) as well as a similar strike by 
Ryanair pilots across several European countries in 2018 (The Guardian, 2018a). 
There have also been cross-country industrial action by Google workers (The 
Guardian, 2018b). The second type of industrial relations conflict – cross firms action 
- can be exemplified by the strike organized across several fast food companies – and 
therefore across the industry – in the UK (The Guardian, 2018c). 
 Shift in the balance of power between labour and transnational capital 
involves the law not just in terms of labour law in the various countries in which they 
operate; it comes also in terms of sectoral definition. We mentioned characteristic (b) 
which highlights the difficulty in assigning companies to specific sectors. So far, legal 
deliberations have considered Uber to be part of the transport sector in terms of 
obligations for insurance and employment relations.  
 As regards the social media companies, the issue of sectoral belonging is hotly 
debated in a more political context: if they are deemed to be part of the publishing 
sector then they become responsible for the content they publish and may have to 
reveal sources. This is not so much an issue of industrial relations as an issue of 
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accountability: the information released on social media has a large impact on the 
results countries’ election and thus on democratic processes. 
 
The two structural changes we considered in this section have a further impact partly 
connected with theory and partly with empirics: the impact on indicators of 
transnationality. 
 UNCTAD has, for many years, developed and estimated a transnationality 
index (TNI) for the world largest 100 TNCs. It is computed as the arithmetic mean of 
the share of: (i) foreign assets in total assets; (ii) the share of foreign revenue in total 
revenue; and (iii) the share of foreign employment in total employment. The 
conceptual framework behind this index is to help “assess the degree to which the 
activities and interests of companies are embedded in their home country or host 
countries.” (UNCTAD, 2007: Chapter V, p. 13). In the same page, two drawbacks are 
mentioned about the index: “…that it does not take into account the size of the home 
country, nor does it distinguish between companies whose activities are concentrated 
in a few countries and companies whose activities are spread across numerous host 
countries.”3 I would like to add a further drawback: the construction of the index – as 
a simple average of three separate indicators – has always been problematic. The two 
structural changes we have been discussing make it more so because the composite 
index makes it difficult to identify possible sources of structural breaks in time 
sequences.  
 In the context of business models based on externalization, is it still 
meaningful to include the employment component in the transnationality index? The 
direct employment of the specific TNC  - and for which it takes responsibility - no 
longer represents the overall control over employment and work conditions over 
which it presides. Could we try and consider separately an indicator of the 
employment trends taking account of the full value chain? There is, in other words a 
mismatch between responsibility and control. In terms of transnationalization, such 
mismatch leads to a decoupling of employment and revenue: a company can be very 
internationalized in terms of sales and revenue but NOT in terms of employment. 
 It should also be noted that the structural changes in employment we have 
highlighted affect employment in TNCs both at home and abroad. It might therefore 
not have effects on the ratio of foreign employment to total employment. There has 
been another structural change which affects TNCs only: the trend towards relocation 
of production abroad. This last trend would lead to a rise in the ratio of foreign to total 
employment. 
 Regarding the other structural change – relatively low level of fixed assets 
(characteristic e) – can transnationality be defined mainly in terms of sales/revenue 
abroad? Should we take account of liquid assets (characteristic f) and not just fixed 
assets abroad? Can we still draw a borderline between international production and 
exports in the case of digital TNCs characterized by (d), non location bound 
production?  
 The increase in liquid assets compared to total assets may be a characteristic 
of other TNCs – or, indeed, of most large firms – not just the technology ones. Should 
this characteristic be taken into account in specific indicators given the fact that it 
affects economies as a whole?  
                                                
3 The relevance of geographical spread of TNCs’ activities is captured in the Network 
Spread Index developed in Ietto-Gillies (1998 and 2009). 
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 For all the above reasons I think that it is now advisable to consider the three 
separate indicators (of foreign employment over total employment; foreign assets 
over total assets; and foreign revenue/sales over its total) instead of - or alongside the  
- composite indicator. It may also be useful to develop indicators of liquid assets in 
relation to total ones. Thus the structural changes may also lead to a rethinking of 
indicator of transnational activities. The more so because important policy issues are 
at stake as we shall discuss in the next section. 
 
In conclusion, we saw that changes in the balance between internalization and 
externalization of the production process and firms’ functions are perceived by some 
economists as requiring a change in the definition of firms and transnationals. A 
rethinking of the concept and definition of TNC may also be necessary in relation to 
the shifting balance in the share of foreign sales to foreign assets. Moreover, the two 




4. Policy issues 
 
In the introduction we mentioned that the modern theory of the TNC started with the 
work of Steven Hymer, a doctoral student at the MIT (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology). Many more theories and works followed. However, the study of 
transnational has not been fully incorporated into the standard study of economic. It 
has tended, on the whole, to be confined to courses in international business or 
economic geography or, partly, of industrial economics. Their impact on 
macroeconomics and policy issues has been neglected.  
 In Ietto-Gillies, (2019, Introduction and Ch. 15) I claim that the reason why 
we need specific theories of the TNC is the existence of nation-states with their 
different regulatory regimes. In such an approach to the TNC the nation-state is seen 
as the locus of a set of regulatory regimes, that is, of a set of specific rules and 
regulations which apply to people, firms and institutions within the borders of the 
nation-state. Some of these rules and regulations stem from the legal or institutional 
system, some from government policies. Most of them embrace several or all aspects 
of both institutional and policy frameworks. They are the following. 
 
• Rules and regulations regarding the social security system and in particular 
different regimes regarding labour and its organization. 
• Fiscal regime including corporation tax and customs and excise duties as well as 
non-trade barriers. 
• Currency regimes. 
• Regime of industrial policy with regard to incentives to businesses. 
• Rules and regulations regarding environmental and safety standards 
 
The differences in regulatory regimes across different nation-states generate 
advantages of multinationality for companies. They are mainly in terms of advantages 
in bargaining with labour for wages and work conditions (Balcet and Ietto-Gillies, 
2020); or in negotiations with governments for financial and other support to inward 
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FDI; and also, very significantly, in terms of TNCs’ taxation liability arising from 
different fiscal regimes of countries.  
 In that work I consider three types of distances between countries: spatial 
distance; cultural distance; and regulatory regimes distance. Traditional economics of 
international trade as well as economic geography in general have emphasized 
distance in terms of spatial distance as an element affecting the cost of transportation 
as well as the availability of resources. The internet has obliterated these costs for 
many services such as financial services. In fact, in the last decade or so, these two 
elements of distance have been pushed to levels never seen before and in opposite 
directions: the geography of space as distance is being obliterated while the 
geography of nation-states and their regulatory regimes is being encouraged, used, 
and often abused by TNCs. While spatial distance no longer matters to digital TNCs, 
distance in terms of the regulatory regimes of countries is important and used to 
minimize their tax liabilities. The business model of digital TNCs – digital products 
and processes – makes spatial distance almost irrelevant. However, there remains 
distance in terms of regulatory regimes between nation-states.  
 This type of distance can generate advantages particularly, but not only, for 
the digital TNCs. By operating exclusively on the internet in terms of both products 
and processes, the digital TNCs can annul the costs of spatial distance while 
heightening the fiscal benefits of distance in terms of regulatory regimes of different 
nation-states. Essentially, the peculiarity of their business means that the company can 
have large amount of sales and revenues in a country but declare very little in the way 
of profits in it. This is because the companies can easily shift costs into countries with 
high tax rates. In other words, we are in a world in which digitalization is making tax 
minimization strategies increasingly easier for companies as well as more difficult to 
detect by tax revenue inspectors.  
 Under pressure from public opinion, governments are becoming wary of these 
practices and some of them are putting forward plans to counteract them. Specifically, 
they are planning taxation of revenues/sales rather than profits. In fact, most 
manipulation happens on the costs side which affects the level of declared profits; 
sales figures and revenues are not easy to manipulate and this explains plans to tax 
revenue rather than profits. The European Union Commission has considered a tax on 
revenues. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is 
currently working on a framework for such a tax acceptable to many countries. The 
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer under the May Government announced in his 
autumn 2018 Budget Statement plans for a ‘2% charge on the UK revenues of 
“specific digital business models”, meaning search engines, social media platforms 
and online marketplaces’ (The Guardian, 2018d). Nothing has materialised from 
these plans in the EU or the UK. However, France has taken action following the 
gilets jaunes protests and passed a law imposing a 3 percent levy on the revenue from 
digital services accruing to firms with more than 25 million euros in French revenue 
and 750 million euros worldwide. President Macron has postponed the introduction of 
the tax and both France and the EU are awaiting deliberations by the OECD on its 
proposed framework. These moves have been strongly criticized by President Trump 
in whose jurisdiction most of the large digital TNCs are based. The whole issue is 
currently under hot debate with Mr Trump putting pressure on the new British 
Government under Johnson not to follow the French and EU line. 
 
Another major issue from digitalization is not much discussed though its impact and 
policy implications are very relevant throughout the world. In many industries the 
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technologies allow reproduction of products at zero or very low cost (Mason, 2015)4: 
from the music industry to publishing to medicines. How much longer can these 
industries survive? Can, indeed, that section of capitalism based on Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) survive the possible onslaught of these industries? Can 
government intervention save them? In fact governments already intervene heavily in 
the pharmaceutical industries by supporting basic research in universities (Mazzucato, 
2013) and in the cultural industries via support on education and research. Indirect 
support is given via the employment of researchers provided by the universities as 
well as via the acquisition of books and journals by publicly-funded libraries. It 
should also be noted that the content of academic journals is largely supplied for free 
by publicly-funded academics. Therefore further public support for these industries is 
possible for example: by further subsidies to the private sector or by the State taking 
on some of the activities currently done by the private sector.  
 
Policy issues arise also from the role of social media in society specifically in relation 
to the data they generate. Some fundamental questions arise from such data: (i) who 
owns or should own the data? Currently the big digital companies own it. (ii) Should 
the marketization of the data be restricted? Prohibited? Subject to conditions such as 
approval by the individuals who – indirectly and unknowingly - provide the data? (iii) 
Are users of social media – the very providers of the data – being manipulated as 
consumers and as citizens?   
  
5. Some macro issues 
 
Any economics undergraduate student of my generation used to be taught that the 
macroeconomy is not the same as the sum of its microelements. I hope the younger 
generations understand this principle – the fallacy of composition - even if they are no 
longer taught it. The principle holds whether the microeconomy does or does not have 
TNCs. However, in advanced economies dominated by TNCs the principle is even 
more relevant.  
 For a start, there are cases in which we are not clear where the micro stops and 
the macro begins. Transnational companies in general and the technology ones in 
particular are very large companies. This means that the impact on macroeconomies 
of the world TNCs can be very large indeed. At the macro level there are some 
important characteristics of the sector which have policy implications. In particular, 
the geographical configuration shows interesting but not surprising patterns, for 
example, the following.  
 (i) At the global level the world TNCs are responsible for some 80 percent of 
world trade. Moreover, a third of this trade is on an intra-firm basis. The first feature 
means that trade policies cannot ignore the role and strategies of TNCs as is becoming 
clear in the context of Trump’s trade war with China. The second feature – intra-firm 
trade – means that the scope of TNCs to minimize their tax liability is greatly 
heightened. TNCs have opportunities to invoice the movements of components or 
services across frontiers but to other parts of the company at prices which are not 
arm’s length prices, those that would be charged to an outside customer. Pricing 
strategies leading to minimum level of overall profits world wide are likely to be 
followed. Such strategies are not legal but difficult to detect particularly because 
many components and services transferred intra-firm are company-specific and no 
                                                
4 A shorter, clear account of the issues in Mason’s book is in Gillies (2015) 
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open market price exists for them. The OECD (2010) gives guidance to companies 
and tax revenue inspectors on how to set prices for internal transfers and how to 
detect possible departures from the norm and legality.   
 (ii) The concentration of investment by digital and ICT companies in 
developed countries, particularly the USA. This raises political as well as economic 
issues which impinge on foreign policies. For example President Trump opposition to 
a revenue tax for digital companies and his overt criticism of President Macron of 
France for implementing such a tax (see Sec. 5) is bound to have effects on other 
countries’ willingness to establish one.  
 (iii) A strong digital divide between regions of the world. The participation to 
the digital economy is very uneven world wide. This means that countries with a low 
participation rate may be lagging behind and suffer from competitive disadvantage. 
The Report gives the percentage of the population using the internet at 83 for 
developed economies and 39 for developing ones with Africa at 20 per cent. 
Corresponding figures for the firms in those economies are, respectively: 81; 58 and 
45 for Africa (UNCTAD: p. 189). 
 The tax minimization strategies of TNCs have important effects at the macro 
level as well as at the micro, company level. The strategy leads to minimization of 
overall tax revenue for the company; the other side of this is that there is a transfer of 
surplus from the international public domain to the private domain. Essentially, in the 
world as a whole less will go to the public sphere as tax revenues, and more will be 
kept in the private sphere of companies because they pay an overall tax bill lower than 
warranted. Moreover, a transfer of surplus takes place between countries because of 
this practice. Countries where value is created may see their legitimate, expected tax 
revenue being siphoned off towards low tax rate countries. In the last analysis the 
practice leads to divergence between private and social benefits worldwide and to the 
redistribution of surplus between different countries. 
There are also effects on the volumes and structures of the balance of payments 
of the various countries involved in the transfers as the recorded values of the 
transactions are different from the value that should have been invoiced on the 
basis of arm’s-length prices (Ietto-Gillies, 2019a: Ch. 23)5. 
We listed characteristic (f) for digital TNCs: high levels of liquid assets abroad. 
UNCTAD (2017: p. 173 and Fig, IV, 11 at p. 174) reports that “Tech 
megacorporations from the united States in UNCTAD’s 2015 ranking of the top 
100 MNEs kept 62 per cent of their total foreign earnings unremitted, a share 
almost three times higher than that of other United States MNEs”. The significance 
of this trend is twofold. First, keeping profits in foreign countries may be a tax 
avoidance strategy: i.e. companies keep their profits abroad to avoid paying the 
higher tax rates in developed countries: a strategy followed by other companies and 
not just the Tech ones. However, the digital TNCs have more scope for such 
strategies because most of their assets are liquid.  Moreover, the huge size of assets 
held in liquid form has an impact on the financial markets and on the degree of 
financialization of the economic system in general: an issue with implications for 
the stability of the world economy.  
  
                                                
5 Carlo Milana has pointed out to me that the large liquid assets of digital TNCs 
combined with a distribution across countries determined by the tax liabilities 
strategies may affect both the size of imbalances between countries and the 
transmission of shocks across them.  
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The size and activities of TNCs generate also problems at the level of data collection 
and their interpretation. This, in turn, creates problems for policy development and 
implementation. Two examples on this. First round-trip investment. UNCTAD (2015: 
188) reports the existence and growth of FDI activities in so-called offshore 
investment hubs. The expression refers to countries used for transit investment with 
funds moving between countries but transiting through these hubs for tax avoidance 
purposes. ‘Some 30 per cent of cross-border corporate investment stocks… have been 
routed through conduit countries before reaching their destination as productive 
assets.’ UNCTAD also reports in the same page that: ‘In 2012, the British Virgin 
Islands were the fifth largest FDI recipient globally with inflows at $72 billion, higher 
than those of the United Kingdom ($40 billion), which has an economy almost 3,000 
times larger. Similarly, outflows from the British Virgin Islands, at $64 billion were 
disproportionately high compared with the size of the economy’. It also reports that 
some developed countries – such as Luxemburg or the Netherlands – also exhibit 
amplified investment patterns and act as hubs for the transition of FDI. 
 Another data issue arises from special concessions – including preferential tax 
rates - for foreign investment but not available to domestic investment. If a 
government allows tax concessions for inward investment and a domestic company 
wants to benefit from them they may indulge in round-trip investment (Sutherland 
and Ning, 2011) in combination with other financial engineering activities. They set 
up a new company abroad and transfer funds to it. This shadow company will then 
invest in the original country benefitting from the tax concessions. The movements of 
funds are recorded as outward and inward by different companies and in different 
countries though, in reality, the funds originate from a single country and belong to a 
single company. These are not easy tricks to spot but there are ways around the 
problem. The point I want to make here is that the tax structure often leads to self-
defeating behaviour for governments; moreover, it affects the reliability of data on 
FDI. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
The paper starts with an analysis of the impact of digitalization on transnationality. It 
examines the impact of the rise of ICT and digital TNCs for theory and policy. 
Macro-micro issues are considered in Section six. 
 My overall conclusions are the following. (1) The rise of Tech  - ICT and 
digital - TNCs makes it compelling that economists devote more time to the 
incorporation of the study of TNCs within the body of economics. (2) The theory of 
the TNC in itself may need reconsideration on the basis of changes in the real 
economy in terms of the growing relevance of digital TNCs. They pose new 
challenges in that the foreign assets component of international production is 
becoming less relevant while liquid assets are increasing. (3) There are great policy 
challenges deriving from the differences in regulatory regimes between different 
nation-states and characteristics of these TNCs. These challenges allow TNCs in 
general - and the digital TNCs to an even higher extent – to: minimize their tax 
liability; avoid responsibility for their workforce; affect the democratic processes 
across countries. 
 Many digital TNCs also raise issues related to market power which is affected 
by (a) their sheer size; and (b) their multinationality which gives them added 
advantages compared to uninational firms. Many of the latter are being wiped out and 
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the landscape of cities is changing under the advance of Amazon and Uber. This 
brings economic and social consequences.  
 What is to be done vis-a-vis this situation. The first point to realize is that 
most of the problems arise from the power of the companies in relation to: workforce; 
consumers; governments. Their size and market power together with their nationality 
– usually American in the case of digital and many ICTs TNCs - raise issues of 
monitoring and controlling power by single countries. The power can only be checked 
by concerted, agreed policies at the country and international level. This seems a 
chimera at the moment. In fact, we are in danger of going in the opposite direction. 
There are movements around the globe aiming at creating more differences in 
regulatory regimes from which the TNCs can further take advantage. This would be 
one of the outcomes of the secessionist movements in Europe: from Scotland to 
Catalonia to the Italian Lega North to Brexit. That the big world powers – from 
Trump’s USA to Putin’s Russia to Xi’s China all want Brexit to happen should sound 
alarm bells as to who would benefit from it.  
 But these issues cannot be convincingly argued if the claim that the study of 
TNCs is the preserve of colleagues working in the Strategy and Management 
Department. We economists have the duty and right to be involved and I hope that 
younger colleagues than me take up the challenge.  
 Moreover, the digital companies are raising concerns that span wider than 
economics and touch on social and political issues. In particular, recent activities at 
Facebook have sparked anxiety about the privacy of individuals’ data and about the 
use of such data for political purposes. It appears that the democratic process in 
several countries may have been compromised by the misuse of data.  
 My conclusion on the above notes is that we may need to rethink our 
conceptualization and definition of TNCs to fit in with the growing digitalization of 
the economy. A definition that considers the following: (a) takes account of foreign 
sales and not just investment and assets; (b) acknowledges the possible coincidence of 
production and sales; and (c) distinguishes between sales abroad via non location-
bound production from exports i.e. sales abroad from production located in the home 
country. Quite a task for twenty-first century researchers. The task of politicians who 
care for the fiscal revenue of their country may be even more challenging. 
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